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ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN 
MICROLENDER’S LOAN SCREENING MECHANISM 
 




Bivariate probit analysis was used to assess the efficacy of a South African microlender’s loan 
screening process. This micro-lender grants short-term cash loans to individuals who are 
employed and earning a fixed salary. Loan applicants with more stable incomes, who are 
contactable via telephone or post, who are employed in less risky business sectors, who have 
more disposable income relative to debt, and who have had a good credit history with other 
lenders, are more likely to be accepted. None of the factors with a significant effect on the loan 
screening decision could explain subsequent loan default by accepted applicants. The micro-
lender may have screened out very risky clients and accepted a riskier, profitable pool of loan 
applicants with risk being controlled through effective monitoring. This is important where 
tangible collateral is unavailable and where the risk must be acceptable to commercial lenders 




Lenders seek cost-effective financial technologies that can assimilate 
information on loan applicants to correctly assess credit worthiness, reduce 
the incidence of incorrect credit rationing, lower borrower and lender 
transaction costs, and manage loan default to ensure financial viability (Hoff 
& Stiglitz, 1990). The micro-lending industry in South Africa serves mainly 
lower-income clientele employed in the formal sector of the economy, earning 
a fixed monthly salary, having limited or no collateral and where information 
is difficult or costly to come by (Du Plessis, 1997). Cost-effective loan applicant 
screening and loan contract enforcement are thus important to reduce adverse 
selection (lender incorrectly granting a loan to a risky client) and moral hazard 
(client takes on a riskier project than agreed to in the loan contract) (Barry et 
al., 1995). However, in their studies Boyes et al (1989) and Jacobson and 
Roszbach (1998), show that the scoring process of lenders may not only be 
designed to minimise loan default risk but also to maximise profit. Their work 
is adapted in this study to assess the efficacy (competence) of the loan 
screening process used by a South African micro-lender (who for 
confidentiality purposes cannot be named). An effective loan screening 
mechanism is important given that tangible collateral such as bank cards are 
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no longer permitted and that government will stop deducting loan payments 
from employee salaries. 
 
Effective screening and contract enforcement can also improve the potential 
for micro-lenders to enter into joint ventures with commercial banks, who are 
looking to expand into the micro-lending market, but lack the appropriate 
financial technologies to do so (Robertson, 2000). Several South African 
studies (see Kuhn & Darroch, 1999 for a summary) have estimated factors 
influencing loan default but have not analyzed the efficacy of the loan 
screening process which requires using data on both accepted and rejected 
loan applicants. This study will help to close this gap in the South African 
micro-finance literature. Section two outlines the economic theory of loan 
screening and specifies an appropriate model for assessing the efficacy of loan 
screening. Sections three and four describe the study data and present results 
of the empirical model. A concluding section highlights credit management 
and policy implications of the study. 
 
2.  THE LOAN SCREENING MODEL 
 
Numerous studies have linked loan repayment performance to borrower 
personal and employment characteristics, previous loan histories or micro-
lender traits (see, for example Boyes et al, 1989; Jacobson & Roszbach, 1998; 
Kuhn & Darroch, 1999 and Schreiner, 1999). Lenders can obtain a competitive 
advantage by developing screening models that can cost-effectively identify 
high and low-risk borrowers. This also has important advantages for the 
potential borrowers, as it may reduce the incidence of incorrectly rationing 
low-risk low-income loan applicants (Chaves & Gonzalez-Vega, 1996). To test 
the efficacy of the loan screening decision, information on both accepted and 
rejected applicants, and the loan repayment performance of accepted loan 
applicants, is needed. Client characteristics used in making the loan granting 
decision can then be compared to characteristics that influence loan default to 
determine whether the loan screening process is effective in correctly 
identifying high- and low-risk borrowers (Hunte, 1993). Lenders operating in 
a competitive environment may, however, not only want to minimise loan 
default risk but also may want to try and maximise profit. Boyes et al (1989) 
showed that profit-maximising commercial lenders may compromise, and 
accept relatively riskier clients that are potentially more profitable.  
 
The econometric model used in this study to assess the efficacy of loan 
screening consists of two simultaneous equations - one for the binary decision 
to grant a loan or not y1i, and the other for the binary outcome, default or 




2.1                                                                            X     y 1i i 1
*
1i ε + β = 1  
 
2.2                                                                          X     y 2i i 2
*




where * indicates an unobserved latent variable, β1 and β2 are vectors of model 
coefficients to be estimated, and Xij  are the 1 x Kj vectors of explanatory 
variables (e.g. client characteristics like income and credit history) when the 
loan application is made. The binary choice variable y1i equals 1 if the loan 
application was granted, and 0 if the application was rejected. The binary 
choice variable y2i equals 1 if the approved loan was repaid more than 50 days 
in arrears or handed over for collection, and 0 if the loan was repaid. Given 
that sample borrowers had, on average more than two loans during the 
January 1998-June 1999 loan monitoring study period, repayment 
performance on the second loan was analyzed to avoid a substantial time 
lapse in which the characteristics of the accepted loan applicants may change. 
Note that y2i is observed if and only if y1i = 1. These equations can be estimated 
independently to assess the efficacy of the loan screening process. The 
truncation resulting from the selection rule can, however, lead to biased 
parameter estimates in equation (2.2) if the loan granting decision is not 
deterministically governed by the borrower attributes such that the error 
terms of the two equations are correlated (Greene, 1990). Meng and Schmidt 
(1985) show that there are efficiency gains in jointly estimating the two 
equations – which accounts for potential correlation between the equations 
and, thereby, for potential sample selection bias. 
 
Given that the dependant variables are binary, a “censored” bivariate probit 
model with partial observability is specified and β1  and  β2 vectors of 
coefficients are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood (Meng & 
Schmidt, 1985 give the appropriate log likelihood function). The level of 
significance and the signs of parameters estimated in equation (2.1) can be 
compared to the level of significance and signs of the parameter estimates in 
equation (2.2). A positive (negative) and significant coefficient in equation 
(2.1) and a negative (positive) and significant coefficient for the same variable 
in equation (2.2), indicates that the lender considered the variable in a manner 
that is consistent with a strategy to minimise loan default. Significant and 
positive signs for coefficients of the same variables in both equations implies 
that the loan granting decision runs counter to a default minimisation lending 
policy. This may be consistent with a lending policy designed to seek out 




The study micro-lender assessed loan applicants according to their stability, 
contactability, affordability and credit history. This led to high 
multicollinearity between potential explanatory variables, as several measures 
were used for each characteristic. Proxies for the Xj explanatory variables in 
equation (2.1) and (2.2) were, therefore, specified to try and best represent 
these client attributes, while at the same time trying to reduce the incidence of 
multicollinearity. Client stability is represented by marital status (MARDUM) 
and unemployment category (EMPCAT); Contactability by home ownership 
and access to a post box (TELPOST); Loan affordability by monthly rental and 
debt commitments relative to monthly income (COMMIT), and credit history 
by loan arrears status with other lenders (ARRDUM) as follows: 
 
  MARDUM  =  1 if the applicant was single or divorced, and 0 if the 
applicant was married or widowed, 
 
  EMPCAT  = 1 if the applicant is a low-income employee in the 
entertainment/hospitality  industry, the security 
guard/retailers/financial services, professional services 
(lawyers, accountants), army/police, or government 
departments dealing with labour, land affairs, transport, 
welfare, correctional services, water affairs and home 
affairs) and 0 if the applicant is a low-income employee 
in non-food manufacturing, construction, textiles and 
foods, health, and education sectors, 
 
  TELPOST  = 1 if the individual had a home telephone, and 0 
otherwise, 
 
  COMMIT  =  1 if monthly rent plus retail debt commitments exceed 
16% of the applicant’s monthly net income, and 0 if they 
are less than 16% of the monthly net income, and  
 
  ARRDUM  =  1 if the applicant had loans with other lenders in the 18 
months prior to the application that were 120 days or 
more in arrears, or had previous bad debt write-offs, 
and 0 if the loan applicants had no adverse loan details 
 
Marital status and employment category, are used by the micro-lender’s loan 
officers as indicators of the potential stability of their client’s future income 
status. Given that a loan contract is based on a promise to repay in the future, 
loan applicants must be able to give lenders an indication of the stability of 




Boyes et al (1989) show that borrowers who were married, and who owned 
homes had greater probabilities of obtaining loans, and were better credit 
risks. This suggests that MARDUM should be negatively related to loan 
approval and positively to loan default. The sector in which loan applicants 
are employed is also likely to indicate the relative stability of future income 
streams, as some sectors are likely to provide more stable incomes than others 
do. Hunte (1993), Kuhn and Darroch (1999), and Schreiner (1999) all include 
variables on employment or business sector to account for this factor. The 
study micro-lender’s loan officers felt that low-income earners in the 
hospitality, security, financial services, professional services, police, and some 
government sectors were particularly prone to retrenchments, and were thus 
relatively greater credit risks. This suggests that EMPACT could be negatively 
related to the loan approval and positively related to loan default. 
 
Lenders can increase the likelihood o f  l o a n  r e p a y m e n t s  b y  r e g u l a r l y  
monitoring clients and/or increasing the borrowers’ stake in the investment 
(Hayami and Otsuka, 1993). The technologies used to monitor clients and 
enforce contracts are likely to depend on the lender’s resources, the legal and 
regulatory framework and the target clientele. The study micro-lender’s 
clients typically have little or no tangible collateral and so loan contracts are 
enforced through intensive monitoring via telephone (visits to clients by the 
loan officers are considered too costly). Clients with a home telephone are 
regarded as being contactable. TELPOST should hence be positively related to 
the loan granting decision and negatively related to loan default. 
 
The COMMIT variable shows the borrower’s potential ability to meet new 
debt commitments. Applicants with more existing commitments against net 
monthly income have relatively less disposable income available to finance 
new debt. A negative relationship between COMMIT and the loan granting 
decision is expected, while COMMIT should be positively related to loan 
default  
 
Reputational capital is an important collateral substitute used by micro-
lenders to enforce loan contracts, and depends on the applicant’s repayment 
record. Clients with good repayment records may be regarded as better credit 
risks and their reputation thus has higher value (Hayami & Otsuka, 1993). 
Previous loan history in South Africa can be assessed via a network of credit 
bureaus that collect loan repayment and loan default information from 
various consumer credit forums. ARRDUM is thus hypothesised to negatively 
influence the loan granting decision and be positively related to loan default. 




The sign of the correlation coefficient between the loan granting equation (2.1) 
and the loan default equation (2.2) shows the extent to which non-systematic 
tendencies to grant loans are correlated with non-systematic tendencies in 
default risk. A positive correlation coefficient implies that the subjective 
elements in the study micro-lender’s loan policy that increase a loan 
applicants odds of being granted a loan, are positively related to loan default 
(Boyes et al, 1989). This is consistent with a loan policy that attempts to seek 
out relatively riskier clients that potentially offer greater expected returns. 
Section 3 reviews the data used to estimate these equations, while Section 4 
discusses model results. 
 
3.  DATA 
 
Data for 800 first-time loan applicants during 1 January 1998-30 September 
1998 were gathered from the micro-lender’s Ladysmith, Pietermaritzburg and 
Pretoria branches. A total of 728 cases could be analyzed, as 65 applications 
were subsequently cancelled. Of the 728 sample applicants, 309 were granted 
credit, while 419 were rejected. Loan repayment performance of the accepted 
loans was then tracked through to 30 June 1999. Of the 309 accepted loan 
applicants, 40 (12%) had repaid their loans more than 50 days in arrears or 
were handed over. The average loan size granted to sample applicants was 
R950. The micro-lender did not use client bankcards as collateral and did not 
ask employers to deduct loan installments from monthly salaries. The 
screening and monitoring technologies used by the study lender were thus 
crucial in ensuring successful loan recovery. Sixty percent of the loan 
applicants were male. Thirty-seven percent of the applicants owned the 
residence in which they lived, and 15% had a housing bond with a 
commercial bank or through their employers. Sixty percent of the sample 
applicants were employed in the private sector and 40% in the government 
sector. The average monthly basic and net salary of those employed in the 
private sector was R1991 and R1598, compared to R3172 and R1881 in the 





The bivariate probit model coefficient estimates are presented in Table 1. A 
residual deviance of –450.64 with 640 degrees of freedom shows no significant 
lack of fit. The signs of the parameters for the loan approval/rejection decision 
meet a priori expectations. Loan applicants with less stable, income, that could 
be contacted less readily, who worked in more risky sectors, with 




delinquent accounts with other lenders were rejected. Characteristics used in 
the loan screening decision tend to have less influence on loan repayment. 
O n l y  e m p l o y m e n t  c a t e g o r y  ( E M P C A T )  has a statistically significant 
coefficient at the 10% level showing that sample borrowers employed in these 
sectors have a lower probability of default which is contrary to what the study 
lender expected in the screening decision. Insignificant coefficients in the loan 
default equation may not necessarily show that the study lender’s screening 
mechanism is ineffective, but that very high-risk borrowers have been 
successfully eliminated at the screening stage with a risky, but more 
profitable, client pool being accepted. This supports the significant, positive 
correlation coefficient (ρ) between the two equations. Non-payment of loans 
may be as a result of exogenous shocks that are unpredictable at the time of 
loan granting or moral hazard where the borrower may take on more debt 
during the loan contract. 
 
Table 1  Results of Bivariate Probit Model 
 
  Equation (2.1): P (loan 
approval) 




















      0.18179 
    (0.9341) 
ARRDUM -1.2619*** 
(-11.008) 
      0.22009 
    (0.9472) 
ρ (1,2)  0.91608          0.91608** 
   (2.012) 
 
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
The impact of this additional debt may only become evident when the 
borrower defaults. Reputational capital, while being very important in the 
initial screening stages, has no influence on borrower repayment indicating 
that high risk borrowers with poor reputational capital may be effectively 




predicting loan repayment performance is expected, as all successful loan 
applicants must be contactable. This highlights the importance of the 
monitoring mechanism in controlling loan default. Loan officers indicated 
that, while a riskier pool of clients may be accepted, the clients are closely 
monitored with any non-payment on the due date being immediately 
followed-up by telephonic contact with the borrower. Thus the lender relies 
heavily on the monitoring technology to control arrears while screening out 




Accurate screening of loan applicants is critical in the credit granting process 
and depends on the screening technology used by the lender and information 
available. Although default minimisation is crucial to ensuring financial 
success of lenders, research has shown that lenders may accept riskier clients 
in trying to maximise profits. However, the riskier pool of borrowers must be 
managed through effective loan contract enforcement. Study results show that 
few sample applicant characteristics are important in explaining loan default. 
This may not necessarily imply a poor screening mechanism but may show 
that the study lender is able to effectively screen out very high-risk loan 
applicants. Moral hazard in the relatively riskier, but more profitable 
borrower pool, is managed through a strict monitoring technology where 
frequent lender-borrower contact is effected by telephonic means. Cost 
effective screening and monitoring technologies will gain increasing 
importance, as microlenders are no longer able to retain bankcards as 
collateral. This is particularly so for microlenders seeking partnerships with 
commercial lenders such as banks. Infrastructural development 
(communication networks) in rural areas may facilitate the monitoring 
process. In addition, microlenders should be encouraged to develop 
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